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Abstract
How should we read Jürgen Habermas, and is it possible to defend a non-
foundationalist conception of communicative reason? In “‘No-Saying’ in 
Habermas,” Stephen K. White and Evan Robert Farr read Habermas’s writ-
ings on civil disobedience through the idea of no-saying, which they believe 
to be “just as primordial” as consensus or yes-saying in Habermas’s theory 
of communicative reason. By underlining this otherwise underdeveloped 
aspect of no-saying in Habermas’s work, White and Farr believe that it is 
possible to avoid an unwarranted emphasis on consensus and to salvage 
a non-foundationalist conception of communicative reason. In developing 
their argument, White and Farr use my deconstructive reading of Haber-
mas’s writings on civil disobedience as a point of contrast, and this gives me 
the opportunity to clarify the strategy of the deconstructive reading and the 
differences over foundationalism that divide my deconstructive approach 
from White and Farr’s reconstruction of Habermas’s communicative para-
digm. I argue (1) that they misconceive the relationship between the decon-
struction and the deconstructed text and (2) that they end up defending a 
view of communicative voice too uncritical of what it means to have a voice.
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How should we read Jürgen Habermas, and is it possible to defend a non-
foundationalist conception of communicative reason? In “‘No-Saying’ in 
Habermas,” Stephen K. White and Evan Robert Farr read Habermas’s writ-
ings on civil disobedience through the idea of no-saying, which they believe 
to be “just as primordial” as consensus and yes-saying in Habermas’s theory 
of communicative reason.1 They write that “the particular no-saying of civil 
disobedience draws its sense and significance from a conceptually prior, 
onto-ethical figuration of no-saying embedded in the core of the paradigm of 
communicative action” (33). There are good reasons for taking no-saying in 
Habermas seriously, and elsewhere I have argued for this using a phrase from 
Habermas, das Nein-sagen-Können.2 Communicative reason implies the 
ability and possibility to say “no” on the part of the participants in communi-
cative action and discourse, and we can think of civil disobedience as one 
practical expression of no-saying. Without this ability and possibility to say 
“no,” the consensual “yes” would have no critical and legitimating force. By 
underlining this otherwise underdeveloped aspect of no-saying in Haber-
mas’s work, White and Farr believe that it is possible to avoid an unwar-
ranted emphasis on consensus and to salvage a nonfoundationalist conception 
of communicative reason. In developing their argument, White and Farr use 
my deconstructive reading of Habermas’s writings on civil disobedience as a 
point of contrast.3 This gives me the opportunity to clarify the strategy of the 
deconstructive reading and the differences over foundationalism that divide 
my approach from White and Farr’s critical reconstruction of Habermas’s 
communicative paradigm.
When White and Farr and I take recourse to Habermas’s writings on civil 
disobedience, we do so not in order to unearth a true, but previously ignored, 
Habermas. We read Habermas in order to explore the limitations and possi-
bilities of his communicative paradigm. We also agree that there is no 
Habermasian “great consensus machine,” to use White and Farr’s expression 
(32). Indeed, the deconstructive reading would not be possible if Habermas’s 
work was a philosophical machine. Instead my reading of Habermas has 
aimed to show that the “machine” is marked by tensions and aporias. 
Consequently, it is misleading when White and Farr write that the result of 
the deconstructive reading of Habermas is to show that Habermas’s commu-
nicative paradigm is a “broken machine” (41). There is no machine, and there 
never was one. To read Habermas as “Habermas the Rationalist” would not 
only be incorrect but would suggest that Habermas had succeeded (or could 
succeed) in rationalizing democracy and law.
Here I part company with White and Farr in our understanding of decon-
struction and of the relationship between the deconstructed text and the 
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deconstructive reading of it. I phrased my reading of Habermas on civil dis-
obedience in a way that could easily occlude what I meant to be doing with 
the deconstructive reading. I wrote that two readings of Habermas were pos-
sible, and that I prioritized one over the other and would use this as my start-
ing point for a deconstructive notion of civil disobedience. I argued that it is 
possible to read Habermas as attempting to rationalize democracy and law, 
but also suggested that the way he treats civil disobedience may suggest that 
something non-rationalizable about democracy and law remains.4
Presenting the reading in this way might suggest what is not the case, 
namely, that it is possible to identify two distinct Habermases: a Habermas of 
the consensus machine and a Habermas of no-saying. Instead, the decon-
structive reading of Habermas attaches itself to the heterogeneity—the ten-
sions and aporias—of his texts and then develops from these. So, like White 
and Farr, I believe that consensus, yes-saying, and no-saying are equally con-
stitutive of Habermas’s work. Neither they nor I are looking for the real 
Habermas by stressing no-saying (51–52).
However, this means that there is no need, as White and Farr write, for the 
deconstructive reading to “radically depart” from the Habermasian frame-
work (41). The reading emerges out of Habermas, and the resources for the 
deconstruction are already there in his texts. To say, as White and Farr do, 
that the deconstructive reading creates “a false dichotomy” (41) between 
Habermas’s text and the reading of it is misleading. The deconstruction is not 
a framework laid down upon Habermas’s texts from the outside, as it were, 
and Habermas’s text and my own text are not two completely different dis-
courses.5 This is not to say that the reading remains within Habermas’s dis-
course; it clearly does not, and I come to Habermas’s texts with a certain 
vocabulary and prejudices. That said, it is important to challenge what would 
be a false dichotomy between the text and the deconstructive reading of it, 
and between the systematicity of Habermas’s philosophy and the aporias that 
mark it.
Having clarified the strategy of the deconstructive reading, I now turn to 
a substantial difference between the deconstructive position and White and 
Farr’s critical reconstruction of the communicative paradigm. The differ-
ence concerns the question of foundationalism and the role of yes- and 
no-saying.
No-saying is central to White and Farr’s nonfoundationalist reading of 
Habermas. Echoing the understanding of equality in the wider literature on 
discourse ethics, they write of the equal right to say “no” as a “moral equality 
that is, in turn, embedded in the idea of communicative action” (51). This 
moral equality does not need to be based in an actually achieved rational 
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consensus; instead it may be based on the idea of “a presumptively just com-
promise,”6 which White and Farr explain as “the expectation of some signifi-
cant moral-political space being available that honors this value of the 
morally equal voice of all” (51).
Although “a presumptively just compromise” is distinguished from a 
rational consensus, the former is inherently linked to the latter in Habermas 
and, it seems, in White and Farr. Although it is merely a compromise—as 
opposed to a rational consensus—the compromise is based on the presump-
tion that, barring “limited resources of time and information,”7 the outcome 
may have been a rational consensus rather than a compromise. This is why 
the compromise is a possibly just one. While there is a gap between compro-
mise and rational consensus because of the limitations of “resources of time 
and information,” the presumption bridges this gap.
This is important because it does not do away with the idea of a rational 
consensus, even if we are not dealing with an actually achieved consensus, 
and even if it plays only an indirect role as a critical ideal. My own reading of 
Habermas has been to point out the aporetic character of the idea of a rational 
consensus: it would suggest a final “yes” with neither room nor need for no-
saying and further communication. The end of communication would be the 
end to communication. In fact, Habermas not only rejects the possibility of 
achieving a rational consensus in practice but also accepts the aporetic char-
acter of the idea of a rational consensus, although without rejecting the notion 
of rational consensus altogether.8
White and Farr’s reluctance to discard of the notion of rational consensus 
suggests that there remains an element of foundationalism in their interpreta-
tion of communicative reason: it remains tied to the idea(l) of rational con-
sensus and, consequently, of rational discourse. They may reject “the 
expectation of redemption through the achievement of rational consensus” 
(51), but the idea of a rational consensus is still doing some work in support-
ing the idea of a presumptively just compromise.
For White and Farr, as for Habermas, communicative reason rests on the 
idea of the moral equality of individuals to say “yes” or “no.” One way to 
think of the rationality of communicative reason is as the equal right to raise 
any concern and in any form. Without this equality, we would not be able to 
clearly distinguish communicative decisions from decisions that were biased 
because of the inequality of the communicative procedures. Another way to 
conceive of the difference between White and Farr’s communicative reason 
and my deconstructive approach is in terms of this equality. For White and 
Farr, the moral equality of persons is what founds the rationality of com-
municative reason. However, if we reject foundationalism, then we must 
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conceive of the equality as instituted. The same goes for the “moral-political 
space” (51) that makes this communicative equality possible; while this 
space may be the foundation for communicative rationality, it is itself the 
result of a founding act.
As a result, communicative reason cannot be content to take the moral 
equality of persons as given, but must interrogate this equality. What an equal 
is, and what equal voice means, are matters of political struggle and should 
be the subject of communicative reasoning, just as what it means to commu-
nicate and to reason must be subject to communicative reasoning. In order to 
be able to say “yes” or “no,” one must first be recognized as a being with the 
right and the ability to speak and to speak within certain limits of rationality. 
If I am not recognized as such, then my utterances will not be heard as speech, 
but at most as noise; my “no” will not be heard as a “no.” My ability to say 
“yes” or “no” is not something given or natural, but is dependent on a posi-
tively instituted discourse in which my utterance can be recognized as a “yes” 
or a “no.” One must interrogate the norms that constitute the “moral-political 
space” of equality to find out if what may appear as noise, silence or even a 
“yes” may in fact be a “no.” This is particularly important in the case of civil 
disobedience, because we are dealing with constituencies that do not other-
wise have their voices heard through other political institutions.
Take the 2011 occupy movements as an example. The mainstream media 
and the political institutions found it difficult to apprehend what the protest-
ers wanted, no doubt because the language and the practices of the protesters 
did not conform to the existing norms for what counts as a political interven-
tion. The protesters emphasized voice, horizontality, and inclusivity as ways 
of organizing society as well as the movements themselves. Yet, as many of 
the protesters realized, horizontality and inclusivity must be accompanied 
with a critical attitude toward the way they are conceived and institutional-
ized. For instance, while the assembly method is meant to be inclusive and 
give everybody an equal voice, some voices may have difficulties being 
heard in the assemblies, and it is therefore necessary to constantly revisit the 
norms of equality.
What divides White and Farr and myself is not the existence of universal 
and ahistorical foundations.9 And, contrary to what White and Farr think, we 
are not divided over the existence of normative standards (51). What divides 
us is the status of those standards. I have argued that a rational consensus is 
aporetic, and that equality cannot be taken as given; equality must let itself be 
reasoned with, and so it cannot do the work that White and Farr wants it to 
do. Put otherwise, White and Farr associate a constitutive negativity with no-
saying (37, 39–40), but reconcile it with the aim of consensus (51). On the 
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deconstructive view, this reconciliation is impossible, and it suggests a dif-
ferent approach to rational consensus, equality, and reason, treating them as, 
in Derrida’s terms, “to-come”: because of their aporetic character, we can 
never take them as given or as realizable, even in a theoretical future.10
At the end of the day, the latter view leaves us without any guarantee 
against “significant harms” (51), but if you do not believe that such a guaran-
tee is possible, then the very search for it may itself lead to harm. At one 
point, White and Farr write that while we must aim at consensus, we must 
also be sensitive to the possible harm done to the Other in this search for 
consensus (51). I agree, but, for me, it means that any consensus is entangled 
with significant harms, and that there is no inclusion of the Other without 
violating her Otherness. What it does not mean is that one should give up on 
attempts to include the Other. Those attempts may always fail, and awareness 
of this failure does not do away with the violence, but it is still better than 
returning to the safety of the moral equality of communicative reason.
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